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discussion is the recent baby boom. We first take a. fresh look at the
historical record in the light of the Kuznets-cycle conception of eco-
nomic change,3 taking care to distinguish the experience of three popu-
lation groups with significantly different patterns—foreign-born, na-
tive-born urban, and native-born rural. Then some possible reasons
for the patterns observed are explored. The analysis is confined to the
white population because of the greater reliability of the data for this
group and its predominant influence in determining the pattern for the
total.
I. Kuznets Cycles in U.S. Population Growth and Fertility
A. The Rate of Total Increase
We start with the rate of population growth. Since we are interested
in focusing on major movements, we employ five-year averages of the
basic data,4 a choice governed partly by preference—to eliminate or at
least reduce the shorter-term changes associated with the ordinary
business cycle—and partly by necessity—because of the initial mold
in which some of the basic data are cast, particularly those relating to
fertility.
Figure 1 shows the average rate of increase of the U.S. white pop-
ulation in successive quinquennia from 1870-75 to 1955-59. The famil-
iar downward drift through the 1930's and the recent increase are
immediately apparent. Less familiar, but equally obtrusive, are signif-
icant fluctuations in the rate of change. The duration of the fluctua-
tions has run from 10 to 35 years and their average magnitude has
amounted to about one-quarter of the mean rate of change over the
period as a whole. In a recent article [27] these fluctuations were sub-
jected to analysis by Simon Kuznets, who found that while all three
components of population change—fertility, mortality, and immigra-
tion—showed evidence of these swings, either in level or rate of change,
major surges and relapses in immigration typically accounted for the
Seethe studies by Simon Kuznets [2611-[29], Mos2s Abramovitz [11[3][41, and
Arthur F. Burns [7], Among recent contributions are Brinley Thomas [421, R. C. 0.
Matthews [35, Ch. 12], and P. J. O'Leary and W. Arthur Lewis [37]. The name "Kuz-
nets cycle" is suggested by O'Leary and Lewis and is adopted here because itis a more
distinctive designation of these (typically) 15-to20-year movements than are terms such
as "long swings" or "long waves," which may be confused with the much longer Kon-
dratieff. Itis somewhat regrettable that O'Leary and Lewis used the term "cycle," with its
inevitable implications of a self-generating process, rather than a more neutral word such
as "movement." Use of the designation here is not intended to imply commitment to a
self -generatirg view of these fluctuations.
Forthe rate of total increase, the average is implicit. The rate, which is actually cal-
culated from observations on the population stock separated by five years, yields a time
pattern equivalent to that of a geometric average of the annual rat.es of change within the
successive quinquennia.AMERICAN BABY BOOM 3
greatest part of the change in total. He then linked these waves in
immigration to corresponding swings in the rate of development of the
U.S. economy, and suggested that the immigration movements were
best explained as a response to swings in the demand for labor in the
United States. This view has been supported along somewhat different
lines by Moses Abramovitz and the present writer [3] [4] [11].
FIGURE 1. RATE OF CHANGE OF TOTAL WHITE POPULATION, 1870-75/1955-59
Source: TableA-i.
Since 1870, then (and indeed even before [27, p. 36] [29]) the
historical record has consistently been marked by major swings in the
rate of population growth. But since the source of the recent upsurge
in the rate of population growth has been a rise in the birth rate rather
than in immigration, one might maintain that this recent increase bears
only a surface resemblance to prior swings and that, given the new
immigration restrictions of the 'twenties, recovery in the rate of growth
was hardly to be expected. Whether this view is correct or whether the
recent movement does bear a logical relation to its forebears is a ques-
tion to which we shall return toward the end of the paper.
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B. The Birth Rate of the Total White Population
Let us turn to the component of population change that constitutes
the center of our interest, the birth rate. Recent work has made it pos-
sible to reconstruct a full century of fertility experience for the white
population of the United The annual birth rate estimates have
been averaged here for successive quinquennia, in keeping with our in-
terest in discerning Kuznets cycles.
The upper panel of Figure 2 brings out clearly the long-term decline
in the level of the birth rate and its recent recovery. It also shows that
the movement of the birth rate—even when smoothed by a five-year
average—has been far from regular. For the period through the secular
trough of the 'thirties, intervals of rapid decline alternated with inter-
vals of slower decline or even absolute increase. These are the long
swings in fertility which Kuznets found in a somewhat different set of
figures. They are apparent throughout the entire 80-year period of
fertility decline covered here.
The lower panel of Figure 2 presents the quinquennial percentage
rate of change of the birth rate, computed directly from the data
plotted in the upper panel.' The average rate of decline per quinquen-
nium through the secular trough in 1935-39 was about 6 per cent. If
this rate had prevailed uniformly throughout the entire period, the in-
dividual observations would have formed the horizontal line shown in
the figure. The movement in the actual observations about the line
makes clear that the variations in the rate of change were of substan-
tial magnitude; in fact, the average value of the deviations from the
mean amounts to six-tenths of the mean rate of decline itself. The du-
ration of the two swings through the first decade of this century was
15 to 20 years, whether measured peak to peak or trough to trough.
The movements since then have been of much longer duration, on the
order of 35 to 40 years.
Economists are perhaps not generally aware of the scarcity of historical data on popu-
lation change. When Kuznets made his study only four years ago, there were no annual
data on the crude birth rate before 1909. The new series, extending our perspective to
the years before the Civil War, is the product of a doctoral dissertation by Melvin Zelnick,
carried on at the Office of Population Research, Princeton University, under the super-
vision of Ansley Coale [73]. The estimates were derived by applying appropriate mortality
rates to the decennial census single-year-of-age distributions adjusted for "age heaping"
(excessive reporting of certain ages, primarily those ending in 0 and 5). As the upper
panel of Figure 2 shows, the patterns traced by these and the official estimates in the over-
lap period are virtually the same; for earlier dates, however, the Zelnick figures are some-
what less reliable because of the lesser accuracy or availability of data needed for the
estimates.
6To avoid confusion, it should be noted that (1)itis the birth rate itself and not the
rate of change therein that is the component of the rate of total population change shown
in Figure 1,and(2)swingsin annual birth or fertility rates do not necessarily imply
swings in the completed fertility of successive population cohorts.65- 75- 85— 95— 05— 15— 25— 35— 45—
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FIGURE2. LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANGE, CRUDE BIRTH 'RATE OF TOTAL WHITE POPULATION
1855-59/1955-59
Source: Table A-2.6 AMERICAN BABY BOOM
But of what interest, it may be asked, is this exercise in quantitative
history for analysis of the baby boom? In reply, one might suggest that
it leads to revision of one's conception of the historical record, a
revision which has significant implications for the interpretation of
recent experience. Typically, the historical movement which has been
emphasized is the long-term secular decline.T To this we would now
add the observation that this decline has been far from regular; that,
in fact, it has been repeatedly characterized by fluctuations of notice-
able amplitude and subtantial duration. The customary interpretation
of the past leads naturally to the view that recent experience constitutes
an abrupt break—a reversal in primary trend. In contrast, the concep-
tion of historical change employed here suggests that recent experience
might be conceived as the latest in a succession of major movements
around the trend—a Kuznets cycle which, for some reason, is of much
greater amplitude and duration than its predecessors. Clearly this view
implies less of a break with historical experience and at least raises the
possibility of more easily reconciling the present with the past—a sine
qua non of any attempted explanation of the baby boom. Moreover, it
suggests a new research strategy with regard to the baby boom, namely,
that one focus on Kuznets cycles, past and present, as the object of
explanation in an effort to determine whether the underlying causes of
these movements may have operated with exceptional force in recent
decades. It is in terms of this conception that the subsequent analysis
is organized.
Before proceeding to this analysis, there is one more feature of
Figure 2 that deserves attention. This is the precipitous decline in the
birth rate during the 1920's. A trend line fitted to the pre-1920 data in
the upper panel and extended through the next two decades would lie
not only above the observations for the 1930's, but above that for
1925-29 as well. From the lower panel, one finds that the rate of de-
cline between the first and second halves of the 1920's was the second
highest in the 100-year record, falling only slightly below that in the
next overlapping decade. This drastic decline during a period of high
prosperity has been cited by demographers as grounds for discounting
efforts to explain the baby boom on the basis of economic factors. For
example:
the interpretation of the baby boom as the natural consequence of
prolonged prosperity is hardly more tenable than the earlier interpreta-
tion of the reversal in the 1930's as momentary. The next earlier period
of notable prosperity in the United States—the 1920's—was a period of
For examples of this see [661[541 and more recently [16, Ch. 2, ii][41, Ch. 13]
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sharply falling fertility. In fact, as Dudley Kirk points out, the de-
pressed 1930's produced more births by far than one would expect on the
basis of an extrapolation of the trend of the prosperous 1920's.8
Clearly, an attempt to reconcile present with past must de-
vote special attention to the record for the 1920's.
C. The Fertility of the Native and Foreign-Born White Populations
The fertility of the total white population is a composite of that of
a number of subgroups, each subject in part to distinctive, in part to
common, influences. We can gain further perspective on the baby boom
if we consider separately the experience of the native and foreign-born
white populations, and, within the former, the urban and rural com-
ponents. Table 1 indicates the proportion of total white females of re-
productive age accounted for by each of these groups at various dates.
In the present section, we consider fertility patterns for the foreign-
born and total native white populations.
TABLE 1—PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WHITE FEMALES, 20—44, BY NATIVITY, AND OF
NATIVE WHITE FEMALES, 20—44, BY RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE, 1890—1950


























Based on 1950 census definition of "urban."
Source:Censusreports.
For our dependent variable, instead of the crude birth rate we now
use the fertility ratio, the number of children under 5 years old to the
number of women 20 to 44 years old, a choice necessitated by the avail-
Ansley J. Coale, Introduction, in [70, pp. 5-6]. The reference is to Dudley Kirk, "The
Influence of Business Cycles on Marriage and Birth Rates" 170, pp. 241-60]. The method
followed by Kirk in his analysis is to correlate "trend deviations of economic measures
(as independent variables) to measures of nuptiality and natality (as dependent variables)"
[70, p. 2421,usingfertility data for the total population for the period 1920-58. While
the results are relevant to analysis of fertility variations within the ordinary business cycle,
in our view they cannot be used to draw inferences about the baby boom. The "trend"
lines fitted for the period 1920-58 largely reproduce the Kuznets cycle 'which constitutes
the baby boom. By concentrating on explaining deviations from'trend," Kirk in effect
eliminates from his analysis the baby boom itself. Moreover, even with regard to business
cycle analysis, it would be of interest to distinguish components of the total population
whose fertility was subject to substantially different influences, asis done below for
Kuznets cycles.8 AMERICAN BABY BOOM
able dataY As the following figures suggest, the fertility ratio typically
exceeds the crude birth rate by a factor in the neighborhood of 20 to 25:
Analytically, this reflects the fact that the fertility ratio is computed
from (a) a denominator about one-fifth as large as that for the crude
birth rate (females aged 20-44 instead of the total population), and
(b) a numerator four to five times as large. (Implicitly, birth experience
over a five-year period is totaled rather than averaged, and is multi-
plied by a survival rate on the order of .85 to .95 to exclude those dying
before the end of the period.) Thus the time patterns traced by the
Total White Population 1885—89 1905—9 1925—29
Crude birth rate, annual average







two measures may differ somewhat because of variations in the ratio of
women aged 20-44to the total population and in the mortality of chil-
dren under 5years,particularly in infant mortality.'0
Figure 3 presents fertility ratios for the foreign-born white population
from 187 5-79 to 192 5-29, and, supplemented by general fertility rates,
for the native and total white populations for somewhat longer pe-
nods.1' The observations on fertility ratios are at census and mid-
census dates, but since they reflect fertility behavior over the preceding
five years, we have dated them according to the quinquennia to which
they refer. The lower panel shows the percentage rate of change per
quinquennium in each series, computed in the same fashion as for the
preceding figure.
Several points deserve mention. First, Kuznets cycles are evident in
the series for both the native and foreign-born groups. Through 1925-
A good discussion of the conceptual and statistical problems relating to the fertility
ratio is given in [16, p. 13 and App. A!.
10Forthe total white population, the only one for which comparison is possible, the
directions of change in the rate of change of the crude birth rate and of the fertility
ratio are identical from 1885-89 on, the principal period of the analysis, with the excep-
tion of the movement from 1905-9/1910-14 to 1910-14/1915-19. This disparity is primarily
due to an understatement of the fertility ratio for 1910-14, because no adjustment was
made for the exceptional effect of the influenza epidemic of 1918.
The fertility ratio estimates, prepared in connection with the present study, are based
in large part on a valuable unpublished memorandum prepared by Everett S. Lee provid-
ing age and parentage detail underlying the quinquennial estimates of native white popu-
lation published by Kuznets [27].Becauseof omissions or defects in the recent reporting
of parentage and nativity, it was not possible to continue these estimates beyond 1925-29.
Etowever, to provide some idea of the pattern after 1925-29, use has been made of the
official estimates of the closely comparable general fertility rate(live births per 1,000
















FIGURE 3. LEVEL AND RATE OP CHANGE OF FERTILITY RATIO, 1865-69/1925-29,
ANDOF GENERAL FERTILiTY RATE, 1920-24/1954-58,
TOTAL WHITE POPULATION BY NATIVITY
Source:TableA-3
29, the timing of the swings appears to be usually the same, but the
amplitude is substantially greater for the foreign-born white. There is
some suggestion of increasing amplitude, particularly for the native
white, and in the most recent period the magnitude of the swing for
this group is strikingly greater than previous ones. Arithmetic analysis
of the swings in the total white group shows that they are caused in
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foreign-born components, and that the contribution of shifts in the re-
lative importance of the two groups has been negligible. The native-born
white group, despite the smaller amplitude of its swings, typically ac-
counted for the dominant part of the movement in the total because of
its much greater share (Table B-i).
Some light is also cast on the precipitous rate of decline in total
white fertility in the 'twenties. For both the foreign- and native-born
populations there is a substantial drop in the fertility ratio between the
first and second halves of the decade. However, the decline for the
foreign-born is more than double that for the native—29 against 12 per
cent. Hence, a significant part of the decline in total white fertility in
the 'twenties—to be precise, about one-third (Table B-1)-.--was owing
to the drastic reduction in the fertility of the foreign-born white pop-
Indeed, for this group, if one adds the movement between the
two preceding quinquennia, the drop in fertility was nothing short of
spectacular. Between 1915-19 and 1925-29 the foreign-born white fer-
tility ratio dropped by about four-tenths, more than double the decline
during the preceding 40 years.
D. The Fertility of the Urban and Rural Native White Populations
Our data now become even more limited, relating only to the latter
half of each decade from 1885-89 on. Estimates published by the Na-
tional Resources Committee [64] for 1905-9 through 1925-29 have
been carried back two additional decades. A constant 5 per cent ad-
justment by the NRC for underenumeration of children under five
years has been accepted here, in part because no basis for a differential
rural-urban adjustment was readily available, and in part because the
analysis rests primarily on the figures for the more reliable censuses
from 1900 on. Our immediate interest is in the pattern through 1925-
29, and estimates for the native white population by rural-urban resi-
dence are only available to this point. To fill out the picture since then,
however, we have added overlap figures for the total white population
for 1925-29 on, an approximation which seems reasonable in view of
the much diminished importance of the foreign-born in recent years.
As is clear from the curve for the total native white group in Figure
4, compared with that in Figure 3, the timing of the Kuznets cycles be-
fore 192 5-29 is such that omission of the observations for the first half
of each decade tends to conceal the long swings. Nevertheless, some
significant points stand out. As the upper panel shows, the decline from
1885-89 to 192 5-29 in fertility of the total native white population was
"Thedecrease in fertility of foreign-born white women was perhaps the outstanding
feature of the decline in the birth rate during the twenties'1a5, p. 127].AMERICAN BABY BOOM 11
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significantly greater than that for either of the components. This was
caused by the depressing influence on total native white fertility of the
continuous redistribution of.population from high-fertility rural to low-
fertility urban areas. Quantitatively this rural-urban shift accounted
for about one-half of the total decline over the 40-year period (Table
B-2). The depressing effect on fertility was about the same in each
successive decade.
A second point of interest is the greater decline in rural than urban
fertility through 1925-29. The rural decline is about half again as great
as the urban—18 as opposed to 12 per cent. Indeed, if one considers
the estimates for urban fertility from only 1895-99to 1925-29, there is
little evidence at all of a declining trend. The over-all reduction in
these three decades is only 4 per cent, and the impression created by
the curve is one of general stability.
This observation of substantial stability for a group accounting in
this period for a third to a half of white females of reproductive age
runs so counter to the common impression of a general and persistent
secular decline that it deserves further consideration. This is particu-
larly the case since this group has tended to assume an increasingly
dominant role in determining the pattern for the total white population
and thus is of central significance for consideration of recent and pro-
spective experience of the white population as a whole.13 Could the
finding be a statistical artifact, resulting from deficiencies in our es-
timating procedure? The possibility cannot be discounted—we have at-
tempted to make a reasonable estimate for 189 5-99, but with more time
and larger resources it undoubtedly could be improved. However, even
if we take only the more firmly based NRC estimates for 1905-9
through 1925-29—at the expense unfortunately of reducing our span
of observation to two decades—there is still little evidence of a signifi-
cant decline. In presenting these data the NRC does not call into ques-
tion the figures for urban native white population, though they are ac-
corded hardly any attention [65, p. 127]. With regard to regional fer-
tility patterns of the total white population, however, the NRC does note
that "these data show clearly a tendency toward the leveling off of
birth rates in areas long influenced by the lower birth rate pattern"
[65,p. 123].
Some additional historical evidence consistent with the finding of
stability is perhaps worth citing. In 1930, Joseph J. Spengler published
a study of the fertility of native- and foreign-born women in New Eng-
"Readers may be reminded in this connection of the finding in Dorothy S. Thomas' pio-
neering study of Sweden [441 that during the 19th century short term fluctuations in
fertility of the total population were initially dominated by fluctuations in agriculture, but
subsequently by those in industry.AMERICAN BABY BOOM 13
land, in which he concluded that "during the period between 1860 and
and 1915 no definite trend appeared in the native fertility rates" [38,
p. 34]. For the period from 1915 through 1925 (the last year of the
study), he found an upward tendency in fertility. Here, then, is an
area in the forefront of the process of urbanization and industrializa-
tion in which native white fertility did not significantly decline over a
long period stretching well back into the 19th century.14 The appear-
ance of a similartern for the nation as a whole at a later date would
clearly be consistent with this earlier New England experience.
One final point should be noted regarding Figure 4. The decline of
total native white fertility in the 1920's is now seen to be owing more
to a decrease in rural than urban fertility. Between 1915-19 and 1925-
29, the reduction in rural fertility was close to 10 per cent, while that
for urban was under 6 per cent. Thus further understanding
of this period calls particularly for an explanation of the rural decline.
E. Summary
While the fertility of the total white population declined substan-
tially from the latter part of the 19th century to the mid-'thirties, there
was significant variation in the rate of change over time and among
component population groups. Even after averaging data so as to elimi-
nate or substantially reduce variability due to the business cycle,
marked fluctuations—Kuznets cycles of 15 or more years duration—
stand out in the patterns for the total, native, and foreign-born white
populations. Moreover, in the first three decades of this century the
over-all decline in total white fertility was owing almost exclusively to
declines for the foreign-born white and rural native white populations
and to the shift from rural to urban areas; the fertility of the urban
native white population, the group of central importance in under-
standing recent and prospective movements in the aggregate, remained
virtually unchanged. Considerations such as these raise the question
whether the baby boom, rather than an abrupt reversal in a long-term
down-trend, might not be at least in part a Kuznets cycle of much
larger magnitude than heretofore. To answer this, itis necessary to
look into possible reasons for these movements.
II. Reasons for Kuznets Cycles in Fertility of
Different Population Groups
Briefly stated, the analytical viewpoint underlying the subsequent
discussion is this: variations in the fertility of a given population group
"A recent re-examination by Robert Gutman [171 of the reliability of the Massachu-
setts birth registration data used by Sperigler, while arriving at a somewhat different eval-
uation from Spengler, does not upset this finding.